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INTRODUCTION
This Essay endeavors to resolve a current controversy involving the
application of the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements. The
pro-arbitration policies of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the antiarbitration instincts of the unconscionability doctrine are difficult to
reconcile. Instead of clarity in this area of law, we have a series of hints
and clues, often contradictory, from the Supreme Court. Although
Professor David Horton and I share a desire to clarify this area of the law,
we have nearly opposite views about how this should be accomplished.
This Essay sets forth my position and also responds to Unconscionability
Wars,1 Professor Horton‘s latest thoughtful effort on the subject.
Courts and commentators have struggled with the question of how
courts should apply unconscionability to arbitration provisions in a manner
consistent with the FAA. The better and more fundamental question is
whether courts should apply the doctrine to arbitration provisions at all. In
a recent article, I argued that courts should not apply the doctrine to these
provisions.2 Professor Horton disagrees with my position and he offers a
vigorous critique of my article in Unconscionability Wars.
Section 2 of the FAA provides that only some state-law grounds can be
used to refuse enforcement of an arbitration provision.3 Until recently, it
seemed settled that unconscionability was such a ground. The Supreme
Court‘s opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,4 decided shortly
after my article appeared, has largely upended assumptions about the
relationship between unconscionability and arbitration and created a much
more favorable environment for the position I advocate. While Concepcion
sanctions the continued theoretical applicability of unconscionability to
Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. I owe many thanks to Sue
Friedman and Doretta Massardo McGinnis for their incisive comments. I am grateful as well to David
Horton for engaging in this discussion and to all the editors on the Colloquy for their helpful suggestions
and hard work on this Essay.
1
David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 13 (2011) (link).
2
Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and Little Monsters, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2035 (2011) (arguing that the FAA removed the judicial power to use unconscionability to deny
the enforcement of arbitration agreements) (link).
3
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (permitting application only of ―such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract‖) (link).
4
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (link).
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arbitration provisions, it leaves very little room for the actual application of
the doctrine. In my view, the case puts back into play the crucial question
of whether unconscionability is permitted under § 2 at all. I argue in this
Essay that it is not.5 I say this because Congress addressed fairness and
other related concerns directly in the FAA (as opposed to permitting courts
to do so through the unconscionability doctrine) and eliminated, in the
context of arbitration provisions, the type of discretion inherent in
unconscionability.
This Essay presents a refined and expanded version of my argument
that incorporates Concepcion and responds to some of Professor Horton‘s
objections to my position. Professor Horton characterizes my initial
argument as ―anti-court‖ because I argued that courts lacked the power to
use the unconscionability doctrine in the context of arbitration provisions.
My argument is not anti-court, but rather pro-Congress. I prefer this term
because my argument simply recognizes that, rightly or wrongly, it was
Congress‘s intent to take the leading role when it comes to the fairness of
arbitration provisions and to limit the role of the courts.
Part I of this Essay briefly describes the uneasy relationship between
arbitration and unconscionability and how Concepcion altered that
relationship. It also describes how Concepcion supports this Essay‘s
argument that unconscionability is not a permitted ground for nonenforcement under § 2 of the FAA. Part II argues that Congress designed
the FAA to play the role that Professor Horton envisions unconscionability
playing. Part III argues that the discretion inherent in unconscionability is
inconsistent with Congress‘s intent in passing the FAA and addresses
Professor Horton‘s arguments to the contrary. Part IV addresses whether
the enforcement mechanism of § 4 of the FAA has any place for
unconscionability.
I.

ARBITRATION AND UNCONSCIONABILITY, B.C. AND A.C. (BEFORE
CONCEPCION AND AFTER CONCEPCION)
Section 2 of the FAA draws a line between state laws that courts may
consider in determining the enforceability of arbitration provisions in
contracts and state laws that courts may not consider when making such
determinations. Section 2 permits courts to consider only ―such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.‖6
Unconscionability, as Professor Horton explains, generally includes
both a substantive component, which addresses the fairness and onesidedness of contract terms, and a procedural component, which hinges on
5

In my prior article, I suggested that unconscionability might be a permitted state-law ground for
non-enforcement but that only arbitrators, not courts, could apply the doctrine. Friedman, supra note 2,
at 2062–64. This Essay goes further, arguing that unconscionability is simply not a ground for nonenforcement under § 2.
6
9 U.S.C. § 2.
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the circumstances surrounding the contract‘s formation, such as whether
terms are buried in fine print.7 Courts routinely apply unconscionability to
refuse enforcement of arbitration provisions.8 Courts doing so are assuming
that unconscionability is a permitted state law doctrine under § 2. That
assumption is less certain after Concepcion.
Before Concepcion, unconscionability was firmly but uncomfortably
on the side of permitted state laws. On two previous occasions, the
Supreme Court described unconscionability as a generally applicable state
law that courts can apply to arbitration provisions in contracts.9 However,
the Court also said that courts cannot ―rely on the uniqueness of an
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement
would be unconscionable,‖10 and that if a court determines that a contract is
fair enough to enforce all its basic terms, such as price, then the arbitration
provision must also be enforced.11 Thus, even before Concepcion, it was
unclear how unconscionability could be applied to arbitration provisions in
a manner consistent with the FAA.
Concepcion is a crucial opinion that places at least some applications
of unconscionability on the side of non-permitted state laws. Concepcion
involved California precedent that rendered most waivers of class-action
arbitration in consumer transactions unenforceable. The Supreme Court
labeled this application of unconscionability the ―Discover Bank Rule‖ after
a key California case.12
The Court began its analysis by stating that unconscionability, like
fraud and duress, was a ―generally applicable contract defense[],‖13 and that
courts could refuse to enforce arbitration agreements based on
unconscionability. The Supreme Court observed that the Discover Bank
Rule raised the ―complex‖ issue of what to do ―when a doctrine normally
thought to be generally applicable, such as . . . unconscionability, is alleged
to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.‖14 The Court
held that the FAA preempted the Discover Bank Rule because the rule
stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA‘s objectives, one of
which is the promotion of arbitration.15 Engrafting a class-action procedure
onto arbitration would, in the Court‘s view, interfere with the efficient

7

Horton, supra note 1, at 18.
Id. at 13.
9
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (link); Doctor‘s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (link).
10
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) (link).
11
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (link).
12
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (citing Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (link)) (link).
13
Id. (quoting Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687) (internal quotation mark omitted).
14
Id. at 1747.
15
Id. at 1748.
8
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resolution of claims.16 Because the efficient resolution of claims is a key
feature of arbitration, the rule undercut arbitration and was preempted.17
Justice Thomas went further in his concurring opinion. For him, courts
are required to enforce arbitration provisions unless ―a party successfully
challenges the formation of the arbitration agreement, such as by proving
fraud or duress.‖18 The unconscionability at issue in Concepcion did not go
to formation, according to Justice Thomas, but rather to public policy.
Thus, the FAA barred courts from considering it.19
Some applications of unconscionability, such as the Discover Bank
Rule, are now clearly on the side of non-permitted state laws. What is less
clear is exactly where Concepcion draws the line, or which applications of
unconscionability are still on the side of permitted state laws. It is difficult
to envision applications of unconscionability that do not obstruct the
objective of promoting arbitration—after all, non-enforcement of an
arbitration provision necessarily inhibits arbitration, at least in the particular
case. However, given the Court‘s description of unconscionability as a
generally applicable ground upon which courts can refuse to enforce
arbitration agreements, some applications of unconscionability may still
belong among the permitted state laws. The line has been moved in a way
that restricts the application of the unconscionability doctrine. How
significant that restriction is remains to be seen.
The Court‘s 2010 decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson20
foreshadowed the result in Concepcion. Jackson reflected a more subtle
hostility towards the judicial application of unconscionability to arbitration
provisions. There, the Court made clear that parties can delegate to
arbitrators the question of whether an arbitration agreement is
unconscionable.21 Jackson thus empowered parties to shift almost all
unconscionability determinations from the courts to the arbitrators.
Taken in combination, Jackson and Concepcion, while not eliminating
unconscionability as a judicial tool for policing arbitration provisions,
marginalized it. In my view, the Court is moving in the right direction.
Concepcion, in particular, makes possible a more direct assault on
unconscionability than the one I originally offered. My prior article, which
appeared before Concepcion, demonstrated a bit of ambivalence. Faced
with the fact that on two occasions the Supreme Court had, in dicta, placed
unconscionability in the category of permitted state laws,22 I was reluctant
to make a full-scale attack on unconscionability‘s status as a defense
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id. at 1752.
Id. at 1749, 1753.
Id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4 (2006)).
Id. at 1756.
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (link).
Id. at 2777–78.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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permitted under § 2. Thus, I conceded the possibility that unconscionability
may be within § 2, but that only arbitrators, and not courts, could apply the
doctrine to arbitration provisions.23 This position had the advantage of
taking out of the hands of the courts a highly discretionary doctrine,
removing the temptation to return to the judicial hostility that the FAA was
designed to undo without running afoul of dicta that the Court had
consistently articulated.
Professor Horton was not about to let me get away with this tactic. He
argues that permitting arbitrators (but not courts) to make determinations of
unconscionability would result in an ―anomaly‖ in which courts would
enforce arbitration provisions that might not satisfy § 2. We would thus
have ―arbitration without a valid arbitration clause.‖24
In fact, ―arbitration without a valid arbitration clause‖ is consistent
with current FAA jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has long permitted
courts to enforce an arbitration provision without first establishing its
ultimate validity. In cases like Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.25 and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,26 the
Court held that a challenge to a contract as a whole (e.g., a challenge that
the contract is void for fraud in the inducement, as was the case in Prima
Paint, or void for illegality, as in Buckeye) is decided by the arbitrator, not
the court. There is no need for a valid arbitration provision for a court to
order arbitration. An arbitration provision in a contract that is adjudged by
the arbitrator to be illegal is not ultimately valid even though the court
enforced it. The Court recognized this anomaly in Buckeye, acknowledging
that the rule ―permits a court to enforce an arbitration agreement in a
contract that the arbitrator later finds to be void.‖27
I do, however, concede a real force to Professor Horton‘s argument.
Fortunately, Concepcion makes a more direct approach possible. By
significantly limiting the range of the unconscionability doctrine,
Concepcion invites us to ask whether unconscionability really is within § 2
at all. That is, rather than put unconscionability into a tiny cage in which it
can barely move, why not put it out of its misery altogether in the context of
arbitration provisions? I argue in the next Parts of the Essay that we should
do exactly that.
II. ONLY ROOM FOR ONE SHERIFF
The key question is whether Congress intended unconscionability to be
among the ―grounds at law or in equity‖ that can be used to revoke an
arbitration provision. I cannot imagine that it did. The FAA provides its
23
24
25
26
27

Friedman, supra note 2, at 2064.
Horton, supra note 1, at 19.
388 U.S. 395, 402–04 (1967) (link).
546 U.S. 440, 443–49 (2006) (link).
Id. at 448.
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own protections, supplanting the role that unconscionability typically plays.
This is true with respect to both the substantive and procedural components
of unconscionability.
A. The FAA Addresses Substance
I begin by noting that Congress specifically and explicitly granted
courts a role in policing the fairness of arbitration. However, courts do not
play this role until after the arbitration hearing occurs, and when they do,
their role is carefully cabined. That role is set forth clearly in §§ 10 and 11.
For instance, § 10 provides that a court may vacate an award if the award
was procured by ―corruption, fraud or undue means,‖ if there was ―evident
partiality or corruption‖ in any of the arbitrators, or if the arbitrators were
guilty of various types of misconduct or exceeded or imperfectly executed
their powers.28 Section 11 sets forth limited grounds on which a court can
modify an award, such as for miscalculations or if the arbitrators ruled on a
matter that had not been submitted to them.29
The FAA is thus quite specific in the powers granted to courts for
assessing arbitration procedures. Judicial review occurs not before the
arbitration proceeds (i.e., ―this procedure might not be fair‖), but rather
afterwards (i.e., ―as it turns out, this procedure was not fair‖). Proponents
of unconscionability must therefore argue that Congress delineated a clear
set of criteria that courts could use only after the arbitration award was
entered, while Congress simultaneously intended that courts would have
roving unlimited authority to assess the fairness of arbitration provisions
before the award stage.
Further, Professor Horton identifies the possibility of arbitration in a
distant forum as a grave danger and one that unconscionability is designed
to police.30 But the FAA has built-in protections against this danger. These
protections have not worked out as Congress anticipated, but this does not
mean that they do not exist. Section 4 restricts where a party can file a
petition to enforce an arbitration provision. A party can only make such
petitions to ―any United States district court which, save for such
[arbitration] agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil
action . . . of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy
between the parties.‖31 Section 4 then includes what was almost certainly
intended as a very important protective provision: ―The hearing and
proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within the district in which the
petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed.‖32 Thus, the
28

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4) (2006) (link).
Id. § 11 (link).
30
Horton, supra note 1, at 21.
31
9 U.S.C. § 4 (link). The Act as originally adopted referred to ―the judicial code‖ as opposed to
Title 28. Pub. L. No. 68-401, § 4, 43 Stat. 883, 883 (1925) (link).
32
Id.
29
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arbitration hearing can only take place in the district in which the petition
was filed.
In 1925, this requirement would have served as a powerful one-two
punch for protecting against forced arbitration in a distant forum. When
Congress passed the FAA, personal jurisdiction was narrowly defined. This
point is made clear in an exchange at the joint hearings of the congressional
subcommittees considering the FAA. When asked where a party could
bring a petition, Julius Henry Cohen, a principal drafter of the FAA,
responded:
Where the defendant lives. That would mean practically
that you have to go to the jurisdiction where the defendant
is, or wait until he comes into your jurisdiction so that
process may be served upon him. The process is exactly
the same as in civil procedure in the Federal courts.33
Because courts could only order arbitration proceedings in the district
in which the party filed the petition, the FAA provided parties with
significant protection. Senator Caraway, during the Senate debate on the
bill, confirmed that this protective language, which had not been in the
original version of the bill,34 was in the final version to ensure that it was
―not possible to drag a man across the country to arbitrate.‖35 Congress
likely assumed that the language of § 4 ensured parties were not required to
arbitrate in a distant forum.
Of course, subsequent developments have greatly weakened the
protection. First, the concept of personal jurisdiction has been dramatically
expanded.36 Second, and perhaps more important, is the proliferation of
readily enforced choice-of-forum provisions.37

33
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the
Comms. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 18 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings]
(statement of Julius Henry Cohen). The question that Cohen was asked by Congressman Hickey was a
bit of a non-sequitur, as it inquired as to where arbitration would be held ―[w]ithout a written
agreement.‖ Id. Of course, without a written agreement the FAA would not apply at all. 9 U.S.C. § 2
(requiring a written arbitration agreement). Congressman Hickey also showed some confusion about
jurisdiction, asking whether the application for arbitration would be made ―to the court where the party
asking for arbitration resides.‖ Joint Hearings, at 18. Cohen‘s answer corrected Congressman Hickey‘s
apparent misunderstandings, explaining that the usual rules of federal civil procedure would apply. Id.
34
See E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Potlatch Corp., 462 F. Supp. 694, 698 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that the
FAA, as originally introduced, did not include this language) (link).
35
66 Cong. Rec. 2761 (1925) (statement of Sen. Caraway).
36
See Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that physical presence is not
necessary for personal jurisdiction but that litigation-related ―minimum contacts‖ may suffice) (link).
37
See J.P. Morgan Secs. Inc. v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 70, 83 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (noting a failure by drafters of the FAA to anticipate widespread use of forum-selection clauses)
(link).
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Although it is beyond me to quibble with the last few decades of
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the decision by courts to enforce
choice-of-forum provisions in arbitration agreements seems quite simply
wrong. Section 4 provides that jurisdiction can be established in any court
that would have jurisdiction of the underlying controversy ―save for such
agreement.‖38 The intent of this language is probably to remove any
possible argument that an arbitration agreement deprived a court of its
jurisdiction. However, the phrase ―save for such agreement‖ does more
than merely prevent the arbitration agreement from removing jurisdiction—
it also should logically prevent the arbitration agreement (including its
choice-of-forum provision) from creating jurisdiction. Thus, jurisdiction
should be addressed, according to the statute, as though there were no
arbitration agreement. In my opinion, the FAA was ahead of its time,
barring the use of choice-of-forum provisions (at least in the context of
enforcing arbitration agreements) long before such provisions became
ubiquitous.
B. The FAA Addresses Procedure
The FAA speaks for the procedural aspects of unconscionability‘s job
as well. Consider the FAA‘s writing requirement: Section 2 places within
the FAA‘s scope only arbitration provisions that are written.39 I have
argued in the past that this requirement serves a very specific purpose—
ensuring that the parties to an arbitration agreement take their obligation
seriously.40
This requirement is exactly the type of danger that
unconscionability is intended to police.
Courts cannot demand, under the rubric of procedural
unconscionability, that parties exceed the statute‘s form requirement to
secure enforcement. Section 2 requires a writing—presumably a ―normal‖
writing—and nothing more. A court cannot require extra-large print, even
though such a requirement might make assent more meaningful. Nor can it
require a signature or initials, even though these are commonly used
signifiers of meaningful understanding and assent.41
That courts cannot exceed the FAA in matters that it addresses may
provide a better justification for the Court‘s decision in Doctor’s
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto42 than the one articulated by the Court. In
Casarotto, the Court held that the FAA preempted a state law requiring
38

9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
Id. § 2.
40
Stephen E. Friedman, Protecting Consumers from Arbitration Provisions in Cyberspace, the
Federal Arbitration Act and E-SIGN Notwithstanding, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 377, 406–08 (2008).
41
Cf. In re Exeter Mfg. Co., 5 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439–40 (App. Div. 1938) (holding that a party was not
able to defeat a motion to compel arbitration under the New York Arbitration Law based on the Statute
of Frauds because all that is necessary under the law is that agreement be written, not that it be signed).
42
517 U.S. 681 (1996) (link).
39
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arbitration provisions to be printed in bold and on the front page of an
agreement because it singled out arbitration provisions for special suspect
status and imposed on arbitration provisions a requirement that it did not
impose on other contracts.43 The Court could just as easily have held that
§ 2 only requires the arbitration provision to be written—not that it be
written in conspicuous text—and that courts cannot add an additional form
requirement to the FAA.
At any rate, the FAA‘s written requirement in § 2 provides a built-in
protection when it comes to form, and the FAA preempts state laws that
demand that parties exceed it under the rubric of procedural
unconscionability.
Thus, Congress included three protective screens. It provided a
postponed and cabined role for judicial review, provided protections against
arbitration in distant fora, and set forth a formal requirement to assure the
arbitration provision was taken seriously. These screens may or may not be
up to the task of providing meaningful protections. They do, however,
demonstrate that Congress intended to deal with the issue of fairness
directly, and not to let courts do so through the doctrine of
unconscionability.
III. DISCRETION AND UNCONSCIONABILITY
A. There’s Discretion, and Then There’s “Discretion”
I previously argued that the type of discretion inherent in
unconscionability is exactly the type of discretion Congress sought to
eliminate with the FAA. The purpose of the FAA was to reverse the
judicial hostility towards arbitration44—a hostility that was manifested in a
variety of judicial rules and devices declaring arbitration provisions
contrary to public policy.45 Hence, Congress likely did not intend the FAA
to re-empower courts to introduce the same hostility through
unconscionability, which is very similar to the discretionary tools Congress
sought to eliminate.46
Professor Horton‘s essay claims that this argument ―sweeps too
broadly‖ in that there are plenty of highly discretionary and pliable
doctrines, such as duress and good faith, that indisputably apply to

43

Id. at 687.
See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2–3 (1924) (describing the judicial hostility that the United States
Arbitration Act was intended to correct); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (noting that the ―need for
the law arises from an anachronism of our American law,‖ reflecting a judicial hostility towards
arbitration agreements).
45
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011).
46
Friedman, supra note 2, at 2050–55.
44
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arbitration provisions.47 Thus, the argument goes, a meaningful line cannot
be drawn between unconscionability and other discretionary doctrines.48
I have a number of responses. First is the matter of degree. While
many contract defenses involve judicial discretion, unconscionability may
in fact be the ―champ‖ in this regard—not only do courts have great
difficulty defining it,49 but courts note its very lack of a definition as among
the doctrine‘s key features.50
Second, the discretion inherent in unconscionability is different in kind
from other types of discretion. It is far more self-contained and hence more
likely to give rise to pockets of anti-arbitration hostility. For instance,
Professor Horton notes that duress hinges on ―easily-manipulated factors
such as whether a threat is ‗improper.‘‖51 But there are important
constraints on a court‘s practical ability to manipulate this factor. Cases
determining the impropriety of a threat in other contexts, such as sales
contracts or non-competition agreements, surely provide guidance and
precedent as to what constitutes an improper threat in cases dealing with
arbitration provisions. Cases involving arbitration provisions must comport
with cases in other contexts. But unconscionability, and particularly
substantive unconscionability (which goes to the one-sidedness and
propriety of the terms), is different. A court could determine that an
arbitration provision is ―not fair‖ simply out of hostility towards arbitration.
Jurisprudence from other types of cases, whether sales contracts or noncompetition agreements, would really have very little relevance to a case
involving an arbitration provision because each type of contract term is so
different. Thus, pockets of hostility could easily develop.
Third, unconscionability is a matter of discretion exclusively for
judges. The FAA was designed to control judicial hostility towards
arbitration provisions,52 not out of concern with the ways juries were
exercising their discretion. Although judges will sometimes be called on to
decide the other types of discretionary matters Professor Horton mentions,
unlike unconscionability these matters are not questions of law whose
development is entirely dependent on judges. Duress is typically a question
for the jury.53 The same is true of good faith.54 Thus, the jury, not the court,
47

Horton, supra note 1, at 22.
Id. at 22–23.
49
See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (noting that it is
easier to decide an unconscionability case than to explain the doctrine) (link).
50
See, e.g., Nu Dimensions Figure Salons v. Becerra, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (―If a
definition were given, it would only limit the application of the concept.‖) (link).
51
Horton, supra note 1, at 23 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981)).
52
See supra note 44.
53
See, e.g., Pierce v. Haverlah‘s Estate, 428 S.W.2d 422, 455 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (noting that the
modern approach is to treat a question of duress as a question of fact) (link).
54
See, e.g., Onal v. BP Amoco Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 650, 658–60 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (noting that
good faith performance is a question for the jury) (link).
48
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typically exercises discretion in these areas, and so the danger of a
resurgence of the type of judicial hostility the FAA eliminated is reduced.
Fourth, the proof of all this may be in the pudding. I argue that the
discretion inherent in unconscionability can readily lead to hostility towards
arbitration. In fact, there is some reason to believe it is already doing just
that. In Concepcion, the Court noted studies indicating that California
courts actually have been more likely to find arbitration provisions
unconscionable than other types of contracts.55 And Professor Steven
Burton has observed that the application of unconscionability to arbitration
provisions has resulted in a new judicial hostility towards arbitration.56 I am
not aware of claims that courts are using other doctrines, such as fraud or
good faith, to express hostility towards arbitration provisions.
That the FAA removed some judicial discretion is beyond argument.
Otherwise, the FAA would not have achieved its purpose of removing
judicial hostility towards arbitration. Professor Horton concedes this point
(to a degree). He notes, for example, that the FAA preempts one version of
unconscionability, which he refers to as ―equitable unconscionability.‖57
Equitable unconscionability, according to Professor Horton, focuses on
whether a contract is ―too one-sided to specifically enforce.‖58 He
acknowledges that the FAA ―eclipses any rule, including equitable
unconscionability, that entitles judges to deny specific performance.‖59
Professor Horton characterizes this form of unconscionability as a crude
precursor to modern unconscionability, to which it is ―only tenuously
related‖60—a sort of Neanderthal to modern unconscionability‘s Homo
sapiens.
However, far from being ―tenuously related‖ to modern
unconscionability, what Professor Horton describes as equitable
unconscionability is actually at the heart of the modern doctrine. The
power of a judge to refuse specific enforcement because of contractual
unfairness is central to unconscionability. An official comment to the
section of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts that articulates the current
unconscionability rule begins as follows: ―Perhaps the simplest application
of the policy against unconscionable agreements is the denial of specific
performance where the contract as a whole was unconscionable when
made.‖61 The first illustration of unconscionability62 is based on Campbell
Soup Co. v. Wentz, a case in which the court denied equitable relief because
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a contract was too one-sided.63 This same case is the first one cited in the
official comments to the section of the Uniform Commercial Code on
unconscionability in sales contracts.64
Not only is ―equitable
unconscionability‖ at the heart of modern unconscionability—it is the form
of unconscionability that is most relevant in a challenge to an arbitration
provision because the party invoking the defense is invariably asking that
an arbitration provision not be specifically enforced.
Judicial discretion exercised under the rubric of unconscionability also
empowers courts in another inappropriate way. Such discretion enables
courts to define the term ―arbitration‖ in a federal statute (the FAA) by
reference to state law. For example, when California courts hold that
procedures for consumer arbitrations must permit class action proceedings,
those courts are effectively using state law to establish the parameters of an
―arbitration‖ that is worthy of enforcement under the FAA. But it is a basic
principle of federal statutory interpretation that ―federal statutory terms are
presumptively governed by federal law absent clear congressional intent for
state law to govern.‖65 The Supreme Court has noted in a different context
that the presumption that Congress does not intend to make the application
of federal legislation ―dependent on state law‖ is appropriate both because
of the interest in nationwide uniformity and the danger that state law might
impair the effectiveness of a federal statute.66
As a number of courts have made clear, despite the incorporation of
some state law in § 2 of the FAA, these same considerations are equally
applicable to determining the meaning of arbitration under the FAA. For
example, in Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holdings Corp., the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the question of
whether a particular alternative dispute resolution procedure was
arbitration.67 The court observed that the definition of arbitration is a matter
of federal law:
That a uniform federal definition is required is obvious to
us. True, the substance of the purchase agreement—who
promised to do what—is governed by state law . . . but
whether what has been agreed to amounts to ―arbitration‖
under the Federal Arbitration Act depends on what
Congress meant by the term in the federal statute.
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Assuredly Congress intended a ―national‖ definition for a
national policy.68
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also
made clear that the definition of arbitration is a federal, not a state, question.
In Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Co. v. Management Planning, Inc., the
court observed that the definition of arbitration was crucial since the word
―arbitration‖ ―establishes the scope and force of the FAA.‖69 The court held
that neither the language nor the legislative history of the FAA
demonstrated a congressional intent that state law should supply the
meaning of this crucial word, and noted, ―Were we to hold that state law
guides our determination, we would empower states to define arbitration as
they choose, thus limiting the FAA‘s utility. This we decline to do.‖70 The
court then proceeded to make the following highly relevant point:
―Congress passed the FAA to ensure that state law would not undermine
arbitration agreements. In passing the FAA to curb state attempts to
eliminate arbitration provisions, Congress likely did not delegate to the
states the power to define arbitration in a way that would circumscribe its
availability.‖71
B. The Silence of the Legislative History
Professor Horton and I disagree over the significance of the lack of any
mention in the legislative history of a role for the courts. In my initial
article, I noted various points at which take-it-or-leave-it contracting and
the imposition of contracts on weaker parties was discussed. I noted that
judicial policing of such contracts was never mentioned.72 To me, this
supports the conclusion that Congress anticipated no such role for the
courts.
Professor Horton argues that I am reading too much into this silence.
He points out that the concept of contracts of adhesion had entered legal
thought in a significant way only a few years earlier and that in 1925
―[p]olicymakers had not started thinking about standard forms as part of a
systemic problem.‖73 That is probably correct, but the concept of courts
protecting weaker parties was hardly novel in 1925. I have argued
elsewhere that unconscionability was well established by 1925.74 For
instance, the Supreme Court observed in 1870 that ―[i]f a contract be
68
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unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court of law will
give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter,
but only such as he is equitably entitled to.‖75 Had concerns about take-itor-leave-it contracts or the imposition of contracts on weaker parties not
come up in the legislative history, then I would probably agree that the
absence of any discussion of a judicial role would be of little import. But
those issues did come up. In my view, the silence about any judicial
policing role is relevant.
Professor Horton also points out that the FAA only applies when
subject matter jurisdiction is established. Professor Horton argues that
diversity jurisdiction‘s amount-in-controversy requirement ($3,000 at the
time) would have screened out ―most consumer, employment, and
insurance agreements.‖76 Thus, Congress would have never faced the
choice between rigorous enforcement on the one hand and a robust judicial
role in protecting the little guy on the other.
As ultimately adopted, the FAA applied only to cases in which the
requirements for diversity jurisdiction (including the amount in
controversy) were satisfied. But the version of the FAA that Congress
debated was very different. It included a provision that dispensed with the
$3,000 amount-in-controversy requirement.77 That Julius Henry Cohen had
this version in mind during his testimony is quite clear. For example, in the
statement he submitted to Congress in support of adoption of the FAA, he
noted: ―Federal courts are given jurisdiction to enforce [arbitration]
agreements whenever under the Judicial Code they would normally have
jurisdiction of a controversy between the parties. (Although, if the basis of
jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship, the usual limitation of $3,000 is
removed).‖78 Thus, the version Congress debated and about which Cohen
testified surely contemplated small cases (involving consumers, insurance
agreements and employment).
While I do not think that congressional silence in this regard is
dispositive or of monumental importance, I do think that it bolsters the
argument that Congress intended for there to be no role for the judicial
policing of arbitration agreements and that it expected courts to rigorously
enforce arbitration agreements.
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IV. WHAT TO ―MAKE‖ OF SECTION 4
Professor Horton and I disagree about whether unconscionability
belongs in § 2. We also disagree about whether it belongs in § 4 of the
FAA. Section 4 provides in relevant part that:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied
that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in
issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement . . . .
If the making of the arbitration
agreement . . . be in issue, the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof.79
Section 4 cannot accommodate unconscionability determinations.
Section 4 calls for trial by jury on disputed issues. In contrast,
unconscionability is a matter for the judge. Additionally, § 4 presents a
stark binary choice between enforcement and non-enforcement. In contrast,
unconscionability gives discretion for limited or partial enforcement.80 The
square peg of unconscionability does not fit into the round hole of § 4.
Professor Horton responds that § 4 does not vest in juries the exclusive
right to determine matters under § 4. He notes that under some
circumstances (i.e., when a jury trial is not demanded) § 4 permits
determinations by the court.81 However, a party can always forgo its right
to a jury trial. Section 4 merely tells us that in such a case the court
determines the matter.82 This language in § 4 is entirely unremarkable and
does not undermine the conclusion that § 4 precludes unconscionability
determinations.
Professor Horton also argues against my position that § 4‘s
preoccupation with jury trials is about safeguarding litigants‘ rights under
the Seventh Amendment.83 Professor Horton suggests that the references in
§ 4 to jury trials are a ―holdover‖ from the New York Arbitration Law that
referred to jury trials to reflect a quirk in New York law that provided for
equitable defenses to be heard by a jury in some cases.84 There is plenty of
reason to think that § 4 is really about the constitutional right to a jury trial.
For instance, the Senate Report‘s description of § 4 concludes by stating:
―The constitutional right to a jury trial is adequately safeguarded.‖85 I am
somewhat dubious that Congress was concerned about preserving language
79
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relating to New York procedure in a section of the FAA that applies only in
federal courts. The lack of any support for this position in the legislative
history bolsters my conclusion.
Professor Horton also argues that my definition of ―making‖ for
purposes of § 4 is far too narrow and that ―making‖ should actually be read
to refer to any defense having anything to do with the arbitration
agreement.86 I cannot say that I know with absolute certainty what
―making‖ means, but it must mean something. Professor Horton virtually
reads it out of § 4. But even if we were to read § 4 as broadly as Professor
Horton argues, unconscionability would still not fit into § 4 for the reasons
already discussed—unconscionability is for a judge and permits limited or
partial enforcement while § 4 directs issues to the jury and provides no
option for limited or partial enforcement.
Given my argument in this Essay that unconscionability is not
permitted under § 2, whether unconscionability fits into § 4 becomes less
important.87 But the fact that it does not may lend some support to the
argument that Congress intended for unconscionability to not be among the
grounds permitted by § 2.
CONCLUSION
Unconscionability Wars is an outstanding effort to resolve the
relationship between unconscionability and arbitration. It did indeed cause
me to recalibrate my own position, though it ultimately pushed me towards
a conclusion, supported by Concepcion, that unconscionability is not within
§ 2 of the FAA.
Congress may or may not have been right in determining that it could
safely remove the tool of unconscionability from the courts. But it did, in
my view, make this determination. Sometimes the simplest answer to a
vexing question is the correct answer: because Congress says so, courts
should not apply unconscionability to arbitration provisions.
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